Download This PaperKnow-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts
9 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Abstract
When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.
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