Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property and the Platform Paradox

53 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2007 Last revised: 2 Apr 2021

See all articles by Timothy Simcoe

Timothy Simcoe

Boston University - Questrom School of Business; NBER

Stuart J.H. Graham

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business

Maryann P. Feldman

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Public Policy; Kenan Flagler Business School

Date Written: November 2007

Abstract

This paper studies the intellectual property strategy of firms that participate in the formal standards process. Specifically, we examine litigation rates in a sample of patents disclosed to thirteen voluntary Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs). We find that SSO patents have a relatively high litigation rate, and that SSO patents assigned to small firms are litigated more often than those of large publicly-traded firms. We also estimate a series of difference-in-differences models and find that small-firm litigation rates increase following a patent's disclosure to an SSO while those of large firms remain unchanged or decline. We interpret this result as evidence of a "platform paradox" -- while small entrepreneurial firms rely on open standards to lower the fixed cost of innovation, these firms are also more likely to pursue an aggressive IP strategy that may undermine the openness of a new standard.

Suggested Citation

Simcoe, Timothy S. and Graham, Stuart J.H. and Feldman, Maryann P., Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property and the Platform Paradox (November 2007). NBER Working Paper No. w13632, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1033758

Timothy S. Simcoe (Contact Author)

Boston University - Questrom School of Business ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Stuart J.H. Graham

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )

800 West Peachtree St. NW
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States
404-385-0953 (Phone)
404-894-6030 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.scheller.gatech.edu/graham

Maryann P. Feldman

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill ( email )

CB 3435
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3140
United States

HOME PAGE: http://maryannfeldman.web.unc.edu/

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Public Policy ( email )

Abernathy Hall
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3435
United States

Kenan Flagler Business School ( email )

Chapel Hill, NC
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
50
Abstract Views
1,183
PlumX Metrics