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Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries

44 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2007 Last revised: 1 Aug 2014

Brian G. Knight

Brown University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Nathan Schiff

Sauder School of Business, Division of Strategy and Business Economics

Date Written: November 2007

Abstract

This paper provides an investigation of the role of momentum and social learning in sequential voting systems. In the econometric model, voters are uncertain over candidate quality, and voters in late states attempt to infer the information held by those in early states from voting returns. Candidates experience momentum effects when their performance in early states exceeds expectations. The empirical application focuses on the responses of daily polling data to the release of voting returns in the 2004 presidential primary. We find that Kerry benefited from surprising wins in early states and took votes away from Dean, who held a strong lead prior to the beginning of the primary season. The voting weights implied by the estimated model demonstrate that early voters have up to 20 times the influence of late voters in the selection of candidates, demonstrating a significant departure from the ideal of "one person, one vote." We then address several alternative, non-learning explanations for our results. Finally, we run simulations under different electoral structures and find that a simultaneous election would have been more competitive due to the absence of herding and that alternative sequential structures would have yielded different outcomes.

Suggested Citation

Knight, Brian G. and Schiff, Nathan, Momentum and Social Learning in Presidential Primaries (November 2007). NBER Working Paper No. w13637. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1033762

Brian Knight (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Nathan Schiff

Sauder School of Business, Division of Strategy and Business Economics ( email )

2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, British Columbia
Canada

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