Executive Remuneration and Corporate Governance in the EU: Convergence, Divergence, and Reform Perspectives
Posted: 30 Nov 2007
This article examines the current controversy as to the effectiveness of executive remuneration as a tool of corporate governance but places the analysis in the particular context of the dispersed ownership/blockholding ownership faultline which runs across European corporate governance. It reveals that there is a close relationship between governance systems and the sophistication and rigour of the regulatory response to executive remuneration. To place the European responses to the executive remuneration question in context, Part I sets out the main theoretical arguments which frame the executive remuneration debate and examines the link between remuneration and corporate governance. Part II examines, in the light of the preceding discussion, the regulatory strategies adopted by EU Member States with regard to executive remuneration and reveals the extent to which their responses track corporate governance systems in terms of sophistication and degree of intervention in remuneration practices, particularly with respect to disclosure. Overall, regulatory strategies focus on company disclosure and corporate governance structures, and are grounded both in public regulation and in corporate governance best practices. Part III discusses reform perspectives with particular reference to the 2002 Winter Report and the 2003 Company Law Action Plan.
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