The Focusing and Informational Effects of Norms on Pro-Social Behavior

38 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2007

See all articles by Erin L. Krupka

Erin L. Krupka

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Roberto A. Weber

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: November 2007

Abstract

This paper reports an experiment examining the effect of social norms on pro-social behavior. We test two predictions derived from work in psychology regarding the influence of norms. The first is a 'focusing' influence, whereby norms only impact behavior when an individual's attention is drawn to them; and the second is an 'informational' influence, whereby a norm exerts a stronger impact on an individual the more others he observes behaving consistently with that norm. We find support for both effects. Either thinking about or observing the behavior of others produces increased pro-social behavior - even when one expects or observes little pro-social behavior on the part of others - and the degree of pro-social behavior is increasing in the actual and expected pro-social behavior of others. This experiment eliminates strategic influences and thus demonstrates a direct effect of norms on behavior.

Keywords: norms, pro-social behavior, experiments, dictator game

JEL Classification: D63, C91

Suggested Citation

Krupka, Erin L. and Weber, Roberto A., The Focusing and Informational Effects of Norms on Pro-Social Behavior (November 2007). IZA Discussion Paper No. 3169, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1038921 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1038921

Erin L. Krupka (Contact Author)

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )

Schaumburg-Lippe Str. 5
Bonn, 53113
Germany

Roberto A. Weber

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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