Negotiating Complex Contracts

14 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2007

See all articles by Mark Klein

Mark Klein

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Peyman Faratin

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Hiroki Sayama

New England Complex Systems Institute

Yaneer Bar-Yam

New England Complex Systems Institute

Date Written: 10/01/01

Abstract

Work to date on computational models of negotiation has focused almost exclusively on defining contracts consisting of one or a few independent issues and tractable contract spaces. Many real-world contracts, by contrast, are much more complex, consisting of multiple inter-dependent issues and intractably large contract spaces. This paper describes a simulated annealing based approach appropriate for negotiating such complex contracts that achieves near-optimal social welfares for negotiations with binary issue dependencies.

Keywords: non-linear negotiation, interdependent issues

Suggested Citation

Klein, Mark and Faratin, Peyman and Sayama, Hiroki and Bar-Yam, Yaneer, Negotiating Complex Contracts (10/01/01). MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4196, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1040961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1040961

Mark Klein (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://cci.mit.edu/klein/

Peyman Faratin

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Hiroki Sayama

New England Complex Systems Institute ( email )

24 Mt. Auburn St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Yaneer Bar-Yam

New England Complex Systems Institute ( email )

24 Mt. Auburn St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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