Ecological Tax Reform and Involuntary Unemployment: Simulation Results for Switzerland

University of St. Gallen, Dept. of Economics, Discussion Paper No. 9806

25 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 1998

See all articles by Gebhard Kirchgässner

Gebhard Kirchgässner

Universität St. Gallen; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Ulrich A. Müller

Olsen & Associates

Marcel Savioz

University of St. Gallen

Date Written: June 1998

Abstract

Using an applied general equilibrium of the Swiss economy the economic consequences of an environmental tax reform are analysed. Such a reform is followed by a substantial reduction of CO2 emissions and the use of non-renewable energy (first dividend), and a reduction of involuntary unemployment. The existence of this second dividend depends, however, on the strategy followed by trade unions. These results are compared with the results of models with voluntary employment, with an energy tax rather than a CO2 tax, and a model where the three most energy intensive sectors are exempted from paying the CO2 tax.

JEL Classification: E47, C53

Suggested Citation

Kirchgaessner, Gebhard and Müller, Ulrich A. and Savioz, Marcel R., Ecological Tax Reform and Involuntary Unemployment: Simulation Results for Switzerland (June 1998). University of St. Gallen, Dept. of Economics, Discussion Paper No. 9806, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=104675 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.104675

Gebhard Kirchgaessner

Universität St. Gallen ( email )

SIAW, Bodanstrasse 8
CH-9000 St.Gallen
Switzerland
+41 71 224 23 47 (Phone)
+41 71 224 22 98 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Ulrich A. Müller

Olsen & Associates ( email )

Seefeldstrasse 233
CH-8008 Zurich
Switzerland
+41 (1) 386 48 16 (Phone)
+41 (1) 422 22 82 (Fax)

Marcel R. Savioz

University of St. Gallen

Varnbuelstr. 14
Saint Gallen, St. Gallen CH-9000
Switzerland
Not Available (Phone)
Not Available (Fax)

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