Creating Illegal Immigrants

CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 1796

Posted: 7 Jul 1998

See all articles by Gil S. Epstein

Gil S. Epstein

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

Arye L. Hillman

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Avi Weiss

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 1998

Abstract

Governments have rarely been successful in adhering to intended consequences of temporary guest-worker policies. The conduit for legal entry of workers has resulted in a population of illegal workers, as the initially legal workers make the move to illegal employment. In this paper we examine the effectiveness of instituting a bond which seeks to make the legal employer the enforcement agent of the government. Our model shows how the bond affects the wage differential between legal and illegal employment of migrant workers, and thereby the incentives for transfer from legal to illegal employment and the extent to which workers remain illegally.

JEL Classification: F22, J61

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Gil S. and Hillman, Arye L. and Weiss, Avi, Creating Illegal Immigrants (January 1998). CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 1796. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=105168

Gil S. Epstein

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972 3 531 8937 (Phone)
+972 3 535 3180 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~epsteig/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration ( email )

Drayton House
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

Arye L. Hillman

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+97 29 774 6424 (Phone)
+97 29 771 5628 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Avi Weiss (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972 3 531 8934 (Phone)
+972 3 535 3180 (Fax)

Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel ( email )

15 Ha'ari Street
Jerusalem
Israel

HOME PAGE: http://taubcenter.org.il/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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