Listen: I Am Angry! An Experiment Comparing Ways of Revealing Emotions

29 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2007

See all articles by Werner Guth

Werner Guth

Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Maria Vittoria Levati

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics; University of Verona - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 4, 2007

Abstract

We report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individuals to voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, we use an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in which responders can only accept or reject the offer, and the other in which they can also scold the proposer. By an unannounced successive two-person public goods game, with either the same partner or a different one, we additionally explore how "having a voice" affects later behavior. The evidence supports the conclusion that voicing one's outrage crowds out the need to harm oneself and the other. Yet, this emotional reaction does not lead to increased future cooperation.

Keywords: Ultimatum bargaining, Public goods game, Outrage, Punishment

JEL Classification: C72, C78, C92, H41

Suggested Citation

Güth, Werner and Levati, Maria Vittoria, Listen: I Am Angry! An Experiment Comparing Ways of Revealing Emotions (December 4, 2007). Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2007-096. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1053841 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1053841

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Maria Vittoria Levati (Contact Author)

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )

Via dell'Artigliere, 19
37129 Verona
Italy

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