Corporate Charters with Competitive Advantages

45 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 1998

See all articles by Shann Turnbull

Shann Turnbull

International Institute for Self-Governance; Sustainable Money Working Group; New Garden City Alliance

Date Written: January 23, 1998

Abstract

Corporate charters, which vest power in a network of control centers, can offer advantages for directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The author describes how he reduced the cost of capital through the establishment of a "Senate" as a watchdog board to improve investor and director protection. A cybernetic analysis is used to indicate how the involvement of customers, employees, and suppliers in corporate governance, as found in Europe and Japan, can provide competitive advantages and improve self-regulation. A theory of firms, and organizations, based on economizing information processing by individuals is introduced to provide a common foundation for other theories. Cybernetic laws of requisite variety are presented as a basis for designing self-governing social institutions with operating advantages to minimize the role and cost of government while improving the quality of democracy.

Suggested Citation

Turnbull, Shann, Corporate Charters with Competitive Advantages (January 23, 1998). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=10570 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.10570

Shann Turnbull (Contact Author)

International Institute for Self-Governance ( email )

PO Box 266 Woollahra
Cell: +61418222378
Sydney, New South Wales 1350
Australia
+61293278487 (Phone)
+61280655905 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://independent.academia.edu/ShannTurnbull/CurriculumVitae
SKYPE: shann.turnbull

Sustainable Money Working Group ( email )

Holyoake House
Hanover Street
Manchester, M60 0AS
United Kingdom

New Garden City Alliance ( email )

113 Guinness Court
Snowsfields
London, UK, hello@gardencities.org.uk SE1 3TA
United Kingdom
+44 207 378 1902 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gardencities.org.uk

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
203
Abstract Views
4,349
rank
72,215
PlumX Metrics