Zurich IEER Working Paper No. 4
52 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 1998
Date Written: March 1998
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequality aversion the puzzles can be resolved.
JEL Classification: C78, D43, H41, C90
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Fehr, Ernst, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation (March 1998). Zurich IEER Working Paper No. 4. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=106228 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.106228