The King Never Emigrates: Political Culture and the Reluctant International Movement of People

CEPR Discussion Paper Series Number 1815

Posted: 22 Sep 1998

See all articles by Gil S. Epstein

Gil S. Epstein

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

Arye L. Hillman

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Heinrich W. Ursprung

University of Konstanz; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: March 1998

Abstract

We consider a country where a king assigns benefits in accordance with privilege determined by the population?s proximity to the throne. People have different relative advantages in seeking privilege and in productive activity. The nature of the contest for privilege determines whether, in equilibrium, the more productive or less productive in society are located closer to the king, and thus who has an incentive to emigrate. When contests for privilege are easy?, the more productive are furthest from the king and emigrate first. When contests are difficult?, the least productive emigrate first. In either case, the population unravels, although emigration is bounded.

JEL Classification: F22, H2, J61

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Gil S. and Hillman, Arye L. and Ursprung, Heinrich, The King Never Emigrates: Political Culture and the Reluctant International Movement of People (March 1998). CEPR Discussion Paper Series Number 1815. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=106230

Gil S. Epstein (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972 3 531 8937 (Phone)
+972 3 535 3180 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~epsteig/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration ( email )

Drayton House
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

Arye L. Hillman

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+97 29 774 6424 (Phone)
+97 29 771 5628 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Heinrich Ursprung

University of Konstanz ( email )

Konstanz, D-78457
Germany
+49 7531 88 3713 (Phone)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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