CEPR Discussion Paper Series Number 1842
Posted: 15 Jul 1998
Date Written: March 1998
Most of the literature on the independence of the Central Bank assumes only one policy instrument is available: monetary policy. If we introduce fiscal policy as well, when preferences may differ among policy-makers, the situation is radically different. In this case fiscal policy will weaken substantially the impact of the Central Bank?s actions, and may annihilate them altogether. The Stability Pact may then be a liability, instead of an asset, because it renders both policies impotent (even if credible). We examine whether there is any incentive to retain monetary policy independence; and whether accountability can and should be used to ensure fiscal and monetary policies support each other, rather than destroy each other.
JEL Classification: E52, E63, F42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Demertzis, Maria and Hughes, Andrew J. and Viegi, Nicola, Independently Blue? Accountability and Independence in the New European Central Bank (March 1998). CEPR Discussion Paper Series Number 1842. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=106386