The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting

16 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2007  

Jack H. Nagel

University of Pennsylvania - Political Science

Abstract

Problems of multicandidate races in U.S. presidential elections motivated the modern invention and advocacy of approval voting; but it has not previously been recognized that the first four presidential elections (1788-1800) were conducted using a variant of approval voting. That experiment ended disastrously in 1800 with the infamous Electoral College tie between Jefferson and Burr. The tie, this paper shows, resulted less from miscalculation than from a strategic tension built into approval voting, which forces two leaders appealing to the same voters to play a game of Chicken. Because the Burr Dilemma poses a significant difficulty for approval voting, this paper urges that researchers give more attention to instant runoff reform options, especially the alternative vote and the Coombs rule.

Suggested Citation

Nagel, Jack H., The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting. Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, Issue 1, pp. 43-58, February 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1065909 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00493.x

Jack H. Nagel (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Political Science ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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