Aggregative Public Good Games

19 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2007

See all articles by Richard C. Cornes

Richard C. Cornes

Australian National University (ANU) - Faculty of Economics & Commerce; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: 2006-01-31

Abstract

We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. In contrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, and can readily analyze games involving many heterogeneous players. We demonstrate the approach at work on the standard pure public good model and show how it can analyze extensions of the basic model.

Suggested Citation

Cornes, Richard C., Aggregative Public Good Games (2006-01-31). Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 9, Issue 2, pp. 201-219, April 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1066057 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00304.x

Richard C. Cornes (Contact Author)

Australian National University (ANU) - Faculty of Economics & Commerce ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601
Australia

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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