Tax Competition Reconsidered

33 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2007

See all articles by Amrita Dhillon

Amrita Dhillon

University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Ben Zissimos

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2006-07-07

Abstract

In a classic model of tax competition, this paper shows that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much or too little public good provision. The key is whether there exists a unilateral incentive to deviate from the efficient state and, if so, whether this entails raising or lowering taxes. A priori, there is no reason to suppose the incentive is in either one direction or the other.

Suggested Citation

Dhillon, Amrita and Wooders, Myrna H. and Zissimos, Ben, Tax Competition Reconsidered (2006-07-07). Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 9, Issue 3, pp. 391-423, June 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1066065 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00312.x

Amrita Dhillon (Contact Author)

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
+44 1 20 352 3032 (Phone)

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

Ben Zissimos

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/cv/ZissimosCV.pdf

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
9
Abstract Views
425
PlumX Metrics