Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision

15 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2007

See all articles by Paul Pecorino

Paul Pecorino

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies

Akram Temimi

University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa

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Date Written: 2006-06-28

Abstract

We analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the Morgan (2000) lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival public goods, per capita provision is found to decrease in group size, even when the lottery prize is proportional to group size. Further, the per capita level of provision will approach zero when group size is sufficiently large.

Suggested Citation

Pecorino, Paul and Temimi, Akram, Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision (2006-06-28). Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 9, Issue 3, pp. 451-465, June 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1066067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00314.x

Paul Pecorino (Contact Author)

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States
205-348-0379 (Phone)
205-348-0590 (Fax)

Akram Temimi

University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa ( email )

Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies
P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States
205-348-8961 (Phone)

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