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Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation Against an Unknown Attacker

26 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2007  

Vicki M. Bier

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Santiago Oliveros

University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: 2005-11-21

Abstract

We study a strategic model in which a defender must allocate defensive resources to a collection of locations and an attacker must choose a location to attack. In equilibrium, the defender sometimes optimally leaves a location undefended and sometimes prefers a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could be achieved at zero cost. The defender prefers to allocate resources in a centralized (rather than decentralized) manner, the optimal allocation of resources can be non-monotonic in the value of the attacker's outside option, and the defender prefers her defensive allocation to be public rather than secret.

Suggested Citation

Bier, Vicki M. and Oliveros, Santiago and Samuelson, Larry, Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation Against an Unknown Attacker (2005-11-21). Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 9, Issue 4, pp. 563-587, August 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1066072 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00320.x

Vicki M. Bier (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Santiago Oliveros

University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics ( email )

Royal Holloway College
Egham
Surrey, Surrey TW20 0EX
United Kingdom

Larry Samuelson

Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

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