An Informationally Parsimonious Impartial Observer Theorem

Posted: 5 Sep 1998

See all articles by Edi Karni

Edi Karni

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics

John A. Weymark

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Abstract

In Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem, an impartial observer determines a social ordering of the lotteries on the set of social alternatives based on a sympathetic but impartial concern for all individuals in society. This ordering is derived from a more primitive ordering on the set of all extended lotteries. An extended lottery is a lottery which determines both the observer's personal identity and the social alternative. We establish a version of Harsanyi's theorem in which the observer is only required to have preferences on the extended lotteries in which there is an equal chance of being any person in society.

JEL Classification: D82

Suggested Citation

Karni, Edi and Weymark, John A., An Informationally Parsimonious Impartial Observer Theorem. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=106617

Edi Karni

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics ( email )

3400 Charles Street
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John A. Weymark

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
1-615-322-1437 (Phone)
1-615-343-8495 (Fax)

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