Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers
Rodney L. White Center Working Paper No. 17-98
Posted: 13 Aug 1998
Date Written: June 1998
Abstract
The paper studies the role of risk arbitrage in takeover contests. We show that arbitrageurs have an incentive to accumulate non-trivial stakes in a company target of a takeover. For each arbitrageur, the knowledge of his own presence (and that he will tender a positive fraction of his shares) is an informational advantage which guarantees that there is a scope for trade with the other shareholders. In equilibrium, the number of arbitrageurs buying shares and the number of shares they buy are determined endogenously. The paper also presents a range of empirical implications, including the relationship between trading volume, takeover premium, bidder's toehold, liquidity of the shares and the probability that the takeover will succeed.
JEL Classification: G34, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Francesca Cornelli (Contact Author)
London Business School ( email )
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