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Intentions and Reciprocity

Jaideep Roy

Murdoch University

Anna Macko

Leon Kozminski Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management (WSPiZ)

May 2007

The perception of fairness of an offer in ultimatum type games may not only depend upon the distributional aspects of the offer itself but also on the intentions of the proposer that an offer may signal. Recovering intentions is subtle and may depend heavily upon the environment and consequently on the construction of the game. For example, one aspect of the environment could be the set of available alternative offers as studied in Falk et al. (2003). In this paper we report an experiment and provide evidence of a new aspect of an environment, which is related to the notion of temptation in a mini ultimatum type game that affects perception of fairness. Two games are put to test. In both games, a proposer has two available offers, fair and unfair, to choose from and the fair offer is kept identical across the games. However, in one game the unfair offer is significantly more skewed in favor of the proposer than the unfair offer in the other game. We show that the rejection rate of the more unfair offer is systematically less than the rejection rate of the less unfair offer across the two games.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: Ultimatum type games, fairness, temptation, intentions, reciprocity

JEL Classification: D63, C78, C91

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Date posted: December 10, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Roy, Jaideep and Macko, Anna, Intentions and Reciprocity (May 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1068973 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1068973

Contact Information

Jaideep Roy (Contact Author)
Murdoch University ( email )
South Street
Murdoch 6150, Western Australia
Anna Macko
Leon Kozminski Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management (WSPiZ) ( email )
ul. Jagiellonska 57/59
03-301 Warszawa, 03-301
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