Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, pp. 1305-1316, 2003
23 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2007
Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.
Keywords: species, concepts, pluralism, eliminativism
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Brigandt, Ingo, Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, pp. 1305-1316, 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1070082