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Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism

Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, pp. 1305-1316, 2003

23 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2007  

Ingo Brigandt

University of Alberta - Department of Philosophy

Abstract

Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.

Keywords: species, concepts, pluralism, eliminativism

Suggested Citation

Brigandt, Ingo, Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, pp. 1305-1316, 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1070082

Ingo Brigandt (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Philosophy ( email )

2-40 Assiniboia Hall
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2E7
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.ualberta.ca/~brigandt

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