Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson's Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity

Noûs, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 295-303, 1999

Posted: 14 Dec 2007 Last revised: 19 Nov 2012

Abstract

This review-discussion critically assesses a debate between Judith Thomson and Gilbert Harman on two approaches to the nature of morality. Thomson argues for the objectivity of morals and Harman argues for a relativistic approach.

Keywords: Ethics, Moral Theory, Objectivity, Relativism, Harman, Thomson

Suggested Citation

Gilbert, Margaret P., Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson's Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Noûs, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 295-303, 1999 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1071249

Margaret P. Gilbert (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine ( email )

Humanities Office Building
Irvine, CA 92697-4555
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.faculty.uci.edu/profile.cfm?faculty_id=5365

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