Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico

40 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by David S. Kaplan

David S. Kaplan

World Bank - Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS)

Joyce Sadka

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

Jorge Luis Silva-Mendez

Stanford Law School

Date Written: December 1, 2007

Abstract

Using a newly assembled data set on procedures filed in Mexican labor tribunals, the authors of this paper study the determinants of final awards to workers. On average, workers recover less than 30 percent of their claim. The strongest result is that workers receive higher percentages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments. It is also found that cases with multiple claimants against a single firm are less likely to be settled, which partially explains why workers involved in these procedures receive lower percentages of their claims. Finally, the authors find evidence that a worker who exaggerates his or her claim is less likely to settle.

Keywords: Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress, Arbitration, Information Security & Privacy, Labor Markets, Judicial System Reform

Suggested Citation

Kaplan, David S. and Sadka, Joyce and Silva-Mendez, Jorge Luis, Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico (December 1, 2007). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4434, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1071382

David S. Kaplan

World Bank - Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Joyce Sadka

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) ( email )

Av. Camino a Santa Teresa #930
Col. Heroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 10370
Mexico

Jorge Luis Silva-Mendez (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
99
Abstract Views
1,094
Rank
518,910
PlumX Metrics