Political Compromise and Endogenous Formation of Coalitions

Posted: 10 Sep 1998

See all articles by Anke Gerber

Anke Gerber

Universität Hamburg

Ignacio Ortuño Ortín

University of Alicante - Department of Economic Analysis

Abstract

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme positions of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise between these two extremes.

JEL Classification: D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Gerber, Anke and Ortuño Ortín, Ignacio, Political Compromise and Endogenous Formation of Coalitions. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=107593

Anke Gerber (Contact Author)

Universität Hamburg ( email )

Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Ignacio Ortuño Ortín

University of Alicante - Department of Economic Analysis ( email )

03080 Alicante
Spain
+34 96 590 3400 (Phone)
+34 96 590 3898 (Fax)

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