Strategic Outsourcing, Profit Sharing and Equilibrium Unemployment

41 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2007

See all articles by Erkki Koskela

Erkki Koskela

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Bank of Finland - Research Department; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Jan Koenig

Free University Berlin

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2007

Abstract

We analyze the following questions associated with outsourcing and profit sharing under imperfect labour markets. How does strategic outsourcing influence wage formation, profit sharing and employee effort when firms commit to optimal profit sharing before wage formation or decide for profit sharing after wage formation. What is the relationship between outsourcing, profit sharing, and equilibrium unemployment depending on whether in other industries profit share is or is not a part of the compensation scheme. What is the optimal production mode in terms of strategic outsourcing. We find that if firms will decide on profit sharing before the wage formation, higher outsourcing decreases wage whereas profit sharing has an ambiguous effect. Under flexible profit sharing wage is higher if optimal profit share is small enough. For equilibrium unemployment, we find that if there is no profit sharing in other industries, outsourcing will decrease the unemployment rate. But if profit sharing is a part of the outside option, then this effect is ambiguous.

Keywords: outsourcing, profit sharing, labour market imperfection, employee effort, equilibrium unemployment

JEL Classification: E23, E24, J23, J33, J82

Suggested Citation

Koskela, Erkki and Koenig, Jan, Strategic Outsourcing, Profit Sharing and Equilibrium Unemployment (December 2007). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2168. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1077057

Erkki Koskela (Contact Author)

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland
+358 9 191 8894 (Phone)
+358 9 191 8877 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de/servlet/page?_pageid=56&_dad=portal30&_schema=PORTAL30&pa_id=7298

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Bank of Finland - Research Department ( email )

P.O. Box 160
FIN-00101 Helsinki
Finland

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Jan Koenig

Free University Berlin ( email )

Boltzmannstr. 20
Berlin, 14195
Germany

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