Strike Three: Umpires' Demand for Discrimination

40 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2007

See all articles by Christopher A. Parsons

Christopher A. Parsons

Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California

Johan Sulaeman

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Sustainable & Green Finance Institute (SGFIN); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER)

Michael Yates

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Busiiness

Daniel S. Hamermesh

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2007

Abstract

We explore umpires' racial/ethnic preferences in the evaluation of Major League Baseball pitchers. Controlling for umpire, pitcher, batter and catcher fixed effects and many other factors, strikes are more likely to be called if the umpire and pitcher match race/ethnicity. This effect only exists where there is little scrutiny of umpires' behavior - in ballparks without computerized systems monitoring umpires' calls, at poorly attended games, and when the called pitch cannot determine the outcome of the at-bat. If a pitcher shares the home-plate umpire's race/ethnicity, he gives up fewer runs per game and improves his team's chance of winning. The results suggest that standard measures of salary discrimination that adjust for measured productivity may generally be flawed. We derive the magnitude of the bias generally and apply it to several examples.

JEL Classification: J44, J71

Suggested Citation

Parsons, Christopher A. and Sulaeman, Johan and Yates, Michael and Hamermesh, Daniel S., Strike Three: Umpires' Demand for Discrimination (November 2007). NBER Working Paper No. W13665, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1077091

Christopher A. Parsons

Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California ( email )

3670 Trousdale Pkwy
Los Angeles, CA 90089
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Johan Sulaeman

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Sustainable & Green Finance Institute (SGFIN) ( email )

Singapore

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/johansulaeman/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

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Michael Yates

University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Busiiness ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

Daniel S. Hamermesh (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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