Evaluating Asset Pricing Models with Limited Commitment Using Household Consumption Data

16 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2007 Last revised: 28 Dec 2007

See all articles by Dirk Krueger

Dirk Krueger

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Hanno N. Lustig

Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Fabrizio Perri

Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2007

Abstract

We evaluate the asset pricing implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because of limited enforcement of intertemporal contracts. Lustig (2004) has shown that in such a model the asset pricing kernel can be written as a simple function of the aggregate consumption growth rate and the growth rate of consumption of the set of households that do not face binding enforcement constraints. These unconstrained households have lower consumption growth rates than all other households in the economy. We use household data on consumption growth from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey to identify unconstrained households, to estimate the pricing kernel implied by these models and evaluate their performance in pricing aggregate risk. We find that for high values of the relative risk aversion coefficient, the limited enforcement pricing kernel generates a market price of risk that is substantially closer to the data than the one obtained using the standard complete markets asset pricing kernel.

Suggested Citation

Krueger, Dirk and Lustig, Hanno N. and Perri, Fabrizio, Evaluating Asset Pricing Models with Limited Commitment Using Household Consumption Data (November 2007). NBER Working Paper No. w13650, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1077802

Dirk Krueger (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-6691 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~dkrueger/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Hanno N. Lustig

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

Stanford GSB
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA California 94305-6072
United States
3108716532 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Fabrizio Perri

Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-998-0251 (Phone)
212-995-4218 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~fperri/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
19
Abstract Views
848
PlumX Metrics