Feeling the Florida Heat? How Low-Performing Schools Respond to Voucher and Accountability Pressure

55 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2007  

Cecilia E. Rouse

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jane Hannaway

Urban Institute

Dan Goldhaber

The Urban Institute

David N. Figlio

Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 2007

Abstract

While numerous recent authors have studied the effects of school accountability systems on student test performance and school "gaming" of accountability incentives, there has been little attention paid to substantive changes in instructional policies and practices resulting from school accountability. The lack of research is primarily due to the unavailability of appropriate data to carry out such an analysis. This paper brings to bear new evidence from a remarkable five-year survey conducted of a census of public schools in Florida, coupled with detailed administrative data on student performance. We show that schools facing accountability pressure changed their instructional practices in meaningful ways. In addition, we present medium-run evidence of the effects of school accountability on student test scores, and find that a significant portion of these test score gains can likely be attributed to the changes in school policies and practices that we uncover in our surveys.

Suggested Citation

Rouse, Cecilia E. and Hannaway, Jane and Goldhaber, Dan and Figlio, David N., Feeling the Florida Heat? How Low-Performing Schools Respond to Voucher and Accountability Pressure (December 2007). NBER Working Paper No. w13681. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1077807

Cecilia E. Rouse (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-2098
United States
609-258-4042 (Phone)
609-258-2907 (Fax)

Jane Hannaway

Urban Institute ( email )

2100 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
United States

Dan D. Goldhaber

The Urban Institute ( email )

2100 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
United States

David N. Figlio

Northwestern University ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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