Charity Auctions: A Field Experiment

22 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2007

See all articles by Jeffrey P. Carpenter

Jeffrey P. Carpenter

Middlebury College - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Jessica Holmes

Middlebury College

Peter Hans Matthews

Middlebury College - Department of Economics

Abstract

Auctions are a popular way to raise money for charities, but relatively little is known, either theoretically or empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. We conduct field experiments to see which sealed bid format, first price, second price or all-pay, raises the most money. Our experiment suggests that both the all-pay and second price formats are dominated by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the difference between existing theory and the field.

Suggested Citation

Carpenter, Jeffrey P. and Holmes, Jessica and Matthews, Peter Hans, Charity Auctions: A Field Experiment. The Economic Journal, Vol. 118, No. 525, pp. 92-113, January 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1077985 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02105.x

Jeffrey P. Carpenter

Middlebury College - Department of Economics ( email )

Munroe Hall
Middlebury, VT 05753
United States
802-443-3241 (Phone)
802-443-2084 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://community.middlebury.edu/~jcarpent/index.ht

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Jessica Holmes (Contact Author)

Middlebury College ( email )

Middlebury, VT 05753

Peter Hans Matthews

Middlebury College - Department of Economics ( email )

Munroe Hall
Middlebury, VT 05753
United States
802 443-5591 (Phone)
802 443-2084 (Fax)

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