Do Abatement Quotas Lead to More Successful Climate Coalitions?*

26 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2007

See all articles by Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera

Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera

Wageningen University - Social Sciences, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group

Michael Finus

University of Stirling

Rob Dellink

Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group; Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

Abstract

In this paper we study the effect of different treaty designs on the success of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We analyze the standard assumption of an efficient abatement scheme and three uniform abatement quota schemes. Apart from analytical results, the analysis is supported by simulations based on the STACO (stability of coalitions) model. It turns out that quota agreements where the members decide by majority or unanimity voting are successful in overcoming free-rider incentives within an IEA. Finally, our results provide a rationale for the application of uniform abatement quotas in IEAs.

Suggested Citation

Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos and Finus, Michael and Dellink, Rob, Do Abatement Quotas Lead to More Successful Climate Coalitions?*. Manchester School, Vol. 76, Issue 1, pp. 104-129, January 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1078170 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2007.01052.x

Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera (Contact Author)

Wageningen University - Social Sciences, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group ( email )

De Leeuwenborch
Hollandseweg 1
6706 KN Wageningen
Netherlands

Michael Finus

University of Stirling ( email )

Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA
United Kingdom

Rob Dellink

Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group ( email )

P.O. Box 8130
Wageningen, 6700 EW
Netherlands
+31 (0)317 4 82009 (Phone)
+31 (0)317 4 84933 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sls.wau.nl/enr/staff/dellink/

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) ( email )

Paris
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/econ

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