Congressional Voting on Funding the International Financial Institutions

The Review of International Organizations 3, 4 (December 2008): 351-374.

36 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2008 Last revised: 22 Feb 2013

See all articles by J. Lawrence Broz

J. Lawrence Broz

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: October 1, 2007

Abstract

The United States is the largest contributor to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, providing resources in exchange for voting power in these international financial institutions (IFIs). While the Treasury Department manages U.S. participation in these institutions, Congress retains authority on funding. With the aim of understanding the microincentives of U.S. support for the IFIs, I analyze congressional voting on bills to fund the IFIs. I argue that Members of Congress are more likely to support a funding increase (1) the more "liberal" their ideology, (2) the larger the share of campaign contributions they get from banks that specialize in international lending, and (3) the larger the share of voters that gain from economic globalization that reside in their districts. Statistical analyses of voting on five IFI funding bills since 1977 provide support for these arguments.

Keywords: International Monetary Fund, IMF, World Bank, International Financial Institutions

JEL Classification: F00, F02, F33, F34, F35, F36

Suggested Citation

Broz, J. Lawrence, Congressional Voting on Funding the International Financial Institutions (October 1, 2007). The Review of International Organizations 3, 4 (December 2008): 351-374.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1080320 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1080320

J. Lawrence Broz (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Code 0521
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
United States

HOME PAGE: http://pages.ucsd.edu/~jlbroz/

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