Average Patent Pendency and Examination Errors: A Queuing Theoretic Analysis

International Journal of Foresight and Innovation Policy, Vol. 4, pp. 112-128, 2008

Posted: 9 Jan 2008

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics

Gregory J. DeAngelo

Claremont Colleges - Claremont Graduate University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Researchers have raised two concerns about the current patent approval process by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). First, it takes too long to process applications. Second, examiners make too many errors in the approval process. The first concern suggests that examiners ought to be less stringent in their decision making and hence take less time in processing applications. The second concern suggests exactly the opposite. Given this state of affairs, we analyze the following question: Does a more stringent examination of applications always lengthen the pendency period? Our theoretical analysis shows that there is no definite answer to this question. Hence, we use numerical methods and our numerical analysis leads to two conclusions. For many values of the model parameters that describe the stringency of examinations, a more stringent examination process does lengthen the pendency period. In contrast, for most values of the model parameter that describes the volume of patent applications handled by the PTO under study, a more stringent examination process does not lengthen the pendency period.

Keywords: Errors, Examination, Patent Pendency, Queuing Theory, Uncertainty

JEL Classification: O320, O340, D810

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and DeAngelo, Gregory Joseph, Average Patent Pendency and Examination Errors: A Queuing Theoretic Analysis. International Journal of Foresight and Innovation Policy, Vol. 4, pp. 112-128, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1081389

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

92 Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY 14623-5604
United States
585-475-2805 (Phone)
585-475-5777 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.rit.edu/aabgsh

Gregory Joseph DeAngelo

Claremont Colleges - Claremont Graduate University ( email )

150 E. Tenth Street
Claremont, CA 91711
United States

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