Lobbying of the International Accounting Standards Board: An Empirical Investigation

45 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2008 Last revised: 20 May 2010

See all articles by Bowe Hansen

Bowe Hansen

Virginia Commonwealth University

Date Written: March 22, 2010

Abstract

This paper provides evidence on how the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) generates accounting standards in the presence of lobbyists with differing preferences. I use theories from the political science and economics fields to develop hypotheses regarding the associations between attributes of lobbyists and their lobbying activity, and their lobbying success. I find that lobbying success is positively related to the ability of the lobbyist to provide information to the IASB; however, this success is dependent on the credibility of the lobbyist. I also find evidence that lobbying success is associated with the impact that the lobbyists have on the viability of the IASB, measured by their financial contributions and the size of the capital market in their home country. However, this association is not present when I look only at cases where lobbyists disagree with IASB proposal drafts. This evidence is useful in evaluating the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) recent considerations regarding the adoption of IFRS by the U.S..

Keywords: International Accounting, Standard Setting, IASB, Lobbying

JEL Classification: D71, F20, M41, M44, M47, G38

Suggested Citation

Hansen, Thomas Bowe, Lobbying of the International Accounting Standards Board: An Empirical Investigation (March 22, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1081413 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081413

Thomas Bowe Hansen (Contact Author)

Virginia Commonwealth University ( email )

Richmond, VA 23284
United States

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