Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Test
KOF Working Papers / KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich No. 185
University of St.Gallen, Department of Economics, Discussion Paper No. 2008-01
30 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2008
There are 2 versions of this paper
Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Test
Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Test
Date Written: January 2008
Abstract
Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact.
Keywords: Terrorism, Decentralization, Democracy
JEL Classification: D74, H70, H40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
By Bruno S. Frey and Simon Luechinger
-
Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Test
By Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer
-
Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis
By Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer
-
Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis
By Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer
-
A Gravity Model of Globalization, Democracy and Transnational Terrorism
-
Economics and Terrorism: What We Know, What We Should Know and the Data We Need
By Fernanda Llussá and José Tavares