Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective

25 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2008

See all articles by Michael N. Young

Michael N. Young

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Mike W. Peng

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

David Ahlstrom

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK)

Garry D. Bruton

Texas Christian University - M.J. Neeley School of Business

Yi Jiang

California State University, East Bay - School of Business & Economics

Abstract

Instead of traditional principal-agent conflicts espoused in most research dealing with developed economies, principal-principal conflicts have been identified as a major concern of corporate governance in emerging economies. Principal-principal conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders result from concentrated ownership, extensive family ownership and control, business group structures, and weak legal protection of minority shareholders. Such principal-principal conflicts alter the dynamics of the corporate governance process and, in turn, require remedies different from those that deal with principal-agent conflicts. This article reviews and synthesizes recent research from strategy, finance, and economics on principal-principal conflicts with an emphasis on their institutional antecedents and organizational consequences. The resulting integration provides a foundation upon which future research can continue to build.

Suggested Citation

Young, Michael N. and Peng, Mike W. and Ahlstrom, David and Bruton, Garry and Jiang, Yi, Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 45, Issue 1, pp. 196-220, January 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1082628 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00752.x

Michael N. Young (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Mike W. Peng

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States

David Ahlstrom

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong

Garry Bruton

Texas Christian University - M.J. Neeley School of Business ( email )

Department of Management
Fort Worth, TX 76129
United States
817-257-7421 (Phone)
817-257-7227 (Fax)

Yi Jiang

California State University, East Bay - School of Business & Economics ( email )

25800 Carlos Bee Boulevard
Hayward, CA 94542
United States

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