Uniqueness in Symmetric First-Price Auctions with Affiliation

Posted: 14 Jan 2008

See all articles by David McAdams

David McAdams

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)

Abstract

The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values.

Keywords: First-price auction, uniqueness, affiliation, interdependent values, all-pay auction

Suggested Citation

McAdams, David, Uniqueness in Symmetric First-Price Auctions with Affiliation. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 136, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1083700

David McAdams (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) ( email )

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