On the Failure of Monotonicity in Uniform-Price Auctions

Posted: 14 Jan 2008

See all articles by David McAdams

David McAdams

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)

Abstract

Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit.

Keywords: Uniform-price auction, monotonicity, independence, affiliation

Suggested Citation

McAdams, David, On the Failure of Monotonicity in Uniform-Price Auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 137, No. , 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1083701

David McAdams (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) ( email )

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