Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting

American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 541-559, September 1994

19 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2008

See all articles by Andrew Gelman

Andrew Gelman

Columbia University - Department of Statistics and Department of Political Science

Gary King

Harvard University

Abstract

We demonstrate the surprising benefits of legislative redistricting (including partisan gerrymandering) for American representative democracy. In so doing, our analysis resolves two long-standing controversies in American politics. First, whereas some scholars believe that redistricting reduces electoral responsiveness by protecting incumbents, others, that the relationship is spurious, we demonstrate that both sides are wrong: redistricting increases responsiveness. Second, while some researchers believe that gerrymandering dramatically increases partisan bias and others deny this effect, we show both sides are in a sense correct. Gerrymandering biases electoral systems in favor of the party that controls the redistricting as compared to what would have happened if the other party controlled it, but any type of redistricting reduces partisan bias as compared to an electoral system without redistricting. Incorrect conclusions in both literatures resulted from misjudging the enormous uncertainties present during redistricting periods, making simplified assumptions about the redistricters' goals, and using inferior statistical methods.

Suggested Citation

Gelman, Andrew and King, Gary, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1084057

Andrew Gelman (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Department of Statistics and Department of Political Science ( email )

New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-4883 (Phone)
212-663-2454 (Fax)

Gary King

Harvard University ( email )

1737 Cambridge St.
Institute for Quantitative Social Science
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-500-7570 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://gking.harvard.edu

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