Corporate Governance in Korea: A Decade after the Financial Crisis

34 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2008 Last revised: 10 Nov 2008

See all articles by E. Han Kim

E. Han Kim

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Woochan Kim

Korea University Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Asian Institute of Corporate Governance (AICG)

Date Written: December 2007

Abstract

Korea has significantly improved its quality of corporate governance since the 1997 financial crisis. Most notable are improved corporate transparency, better alignment of managerial incentives to shareholder value, and more effective oversight by the board. A number of players also have emerged as key external monitors and enforcers of good governance. There remain, however, substantial differences between non-chaebol and chaebol affiliated firms and also across chaebol. This paper describes these differences and the current state of Korean corporate governance.

Keywords: corporate governance, chaebol, Korea financial crisis

JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Kim, E. Han and Kim, Woochan, Corporate Governance in Korea: A Decade after the Financial Crisis (December 2007). U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 123. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1084066 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1084066

E. Han Kim (Contact Author)

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
734-764-2282 (Phone)
734-763-3117 (Fax)

Woochan Kim

Korea University Business School ( email )

LG-POSCO Bldg #524
Anam-Dong, Seongbuk-Ku
Seoul, Seoul 136701
+822-3290-2816 (Phone)
+822-922-7220 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://biz.korea.ac.kr/professor/wckim

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Asian Institute of Corporate Governance (AICG) ( email )

1, 5-ga, Anam-dong
Sungbuk-gu
Seoul, 136-701
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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