Fiscal Policy with Multiple Policymakers: Veto Actors and Deadlock; Collective Action and Common Pools; Bargaining and Compromise

VETO PLAYERS AND POLICY CHANGE, Hideko Magara, ed., pp. 118-161, Waseda University Press, 2007

32 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2008 Last revised: 25 Jan 2008

Abstract

When considering the implications for fiscal-policy outcomes (especially deficits and debts) of the dispersion of policymaking authority across multiple actors, recent veto-actor scholarship has emphasized its potential to privilege the status quo and thus retard policy-adjustment rates. In similar contexts, however, others have stressed collective-action and common-pool issues that arise when multiple policymakers share authority over policies. Still others have highlighted the bargaining and compromise aspects of policymaking with multiple actors. This paper offers a synthetic discussion of these multifarious effects of the number and diversity of policymaking actors, thereby placing veto-actor considerations in broader theoretical context, and it offers an empirical approach to modeling these manifold effects distinctly and effectively. It then offers an initial exploration of this synthetic-theoretical and structured-empirical approach in a substantively important policy context: the evolution of fiscal policy in developed democracies from the 1950s through the 1990s.

Keywords: Veto Actors, Common Pool Problem, Bargaining, Fiscal Policy

JEL Classification: E62, H00

Suggested Citation

Franzese, Robert J., Fiscal Policy with Multiple Policymakers: Veto Actors and Deadlock; Collective Action and Common Pools; Bargaining and Compromise. VETO PLAYERS AND POLICY CHANGE, Hideko Magara, ed., pp. 118-161, Waseda University Press, 2007 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1084095

Robert J. Franzese (Contact Author)

University of Michigan ( email )

Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-936-1850 (Phone)
734-764-3341 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/

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