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https://ssrn.com/abstract=1085909
 
 

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Tipping and Concentration in Markets with Indirect Network Effects


Jean-Pierre Dubé


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Günter J. Hitsch


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Pradeep K. Chintagunta


University of Chicago

July 14, 2008

Chicago GSB Research Paper No. 08-08

Abstract:     
This paper develops a framework to measure "tipping" - the increase in a firm's market share dominance caused by indirect network effects. Our measure compares the expected concentration in a market to the hypothetical expected concentration that would arise in the absence of indirect network effects. In practice, this measure requires a model that can predict the counter-factual market concentration under different parameter values capturing the strength of indirect network effects. We build such a model for the case of dynamic standards competition in a market characterized by the classic hardware/software paradigm. To demonstrate its applicability, we calibrate it using demand estimates and other data from the 32/64-bit generation of video game consoles, a canonical example of standards competition with indirect network effects. In our example, we find that indirect network effects can lead to a strong, economically significant increase in market concentration. We also find important roles for beliefs on both the demand side, as consumer's tend to pick the product they expect to win the standards war, and on the supply side, as firms engage in penetration pricing to invest in growing their networks.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: Dynamic Oligopoly, network effects, antitrust, concentration, durable goods, penetration pricing

JEL Classification: L13, L41, M31


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Date posted: January 21, 2008 ; Last revised: August 11, 2008

Suggested Citation

Dubé, Jean-Pierre and Hitsch, Günter J. and Chintagunta, Pradeep K., Tipping and Concentration in Markets with Indirect Network Effects (July 14, 2008). Chicago GSB Research Paper No. 08-08. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1085909 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1085909

Contact Information

Jean-Pierre H. Dube (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
HOME PAGE: http://gsb.uchicago.edu/fac/jean-pierre.dube

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Gunter J. Hitsch
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

Pradeep K. Chintagunta
University of Chicago ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-8015 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

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