Corporate Real Estate and Corporate Takeovers: International Evidence

22 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2008 Last revised: 17 Jul 2009

See all articles by Dirk Brounen

Dirk Brounen

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Financial Management; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM); Tinbergen Institute

Piet M. A. Eichholtz

University of Maastricht - Limburg Institute of Financial Economics (LIFE)

Mathijs A. Van Dijk

Erasmus University - Rotterdam School of Management; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)

Abstract

This study investigates whether corporate real estate ownership is a trigger for takeovers. The empirical analysis is based on a sample covering 225 takeovers in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom between 1992 and 2003. Using a multivariate probit model that controls for various financial firm characteristics, we find that the role of corporate real estate in takeovers depends on the nature of the takeover, the industry, the period, and the country. The presence of corporate real estate is a significantly positive predictor for takeovers within the same industry. Companies that have been taken over appear to have been reducing their real estate holdings prior to the takeover, which would suggest a financial distress situation.

Keywords: corporate real estate, firm characteristics

Suggested Citation

Brounen, Dirk and Eichholtz, Piet M. A. and Van Dijk, Mathijs A., Corporate Real Estate and Corporate Takeovers: International Evidence. Journal of Real Estate Research (JRER), Vol. 30, No. 3, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1086212

Dirk Brounen (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Financial Management ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T09-53
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 1 0408 2371 (Phone)
+31 1 0408 9017 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.eur.nl/fbk/dep/dep5/faculty/dbrounen

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands
120-551-3535 (Phone)

Piet M. A. Eichholtz

University of Maastricht - Limburg Institute of Financial Economics (LIFE) ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
+31 43 3883648 (Phone)
+31 43 3258530 (Fax)

Mathijs A. Van Dijk

Erasmus University - Rotterdam School of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31 10 408 1124 (Phone)
+31 10 408 9017 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mathijsavandijk.com/

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

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