Contracting Across Separated Networks in Telecommunications

Communications and Strategies, No. 68, p. 21, 2007

Posted: 23 May 2008

See all articles by Martin E. Cave

Martin E. Cave

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School; Brunel University London

Chris Doyle

University of Warwick - Centre for Management under Regulation (CMUR)

Abstract

The issue of separating telecommunications networks - either functionally within a common ownership structure or structurally, under separate ownership - has attracted much recent attention. The paper discusses different forms of separation and the motives for them, and examines the question of how investment can be co-ordinated across the boundary.

This issue (in particular the significance of the so-called hold up problem) is examined both theoretically and with respect to case studies of regulated and unregulated sectors. The authors conclude that sophisticated forms of contract or other procedures are likely to be able to overcome problems of co-ordinating investment. Regulators should not on this account stand in the way of voluntary structural separation.

Keywords: telecommunications networks, structural separation, functional separation, Telecommunications, Access regulation, regulation, infrastructure, Interconnection,

JEL Classification: L96,

Suggested Citation

Cave, Martin E. and Doyle, Chris, Contracting Across Separated Networks in Telecommunications. Communications and Strategies, No. 68, p. 21, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1086301

Martin E. Cave (Contact Author)

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )

Centre for Management under Regulation (CMuR)
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Brunel University London

Kingston Lane
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom

Chris Doyle

University of Warwick - Centre for Management under Regulation (CMUR) ( email )

Warwick Business School
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

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