Horses for Courses: Fund Managers and Organizational Structures

59 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2008

See all articles by Yufeng Han

Yufeng Han

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Charlotte - Finance

Michael J. Rebello

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Thomas H. Noe

University of Oxford - Said Business School; University of Oxford - Balliol College; Bank of Finland; European Corporate Governance Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 22, 2008

Abstract

This paper considers the team management of mutual funds, fund manager ability, fund performance, and holdings. We find evidence suggesting a positive relation between fund performance and team management concurrent with a negative relation between managerial ability and the use of team management. Consistent with the notion that team management suppresses portfolio eccentricity and leads to more generic trading strategies, thereby both increasing returns and making returns less informative of fund manager ability, we also find that team management is associated with less idiosyncratic portfolio holdings and a greater loading on large capitalization, low book-to-market, and momentum stocks.

Keywords: Team Management, Fund Performance, Self Selection

JEL Classification: G29

Suggested Citation

Han, Yufeng and Rebello, Michael J. and Noe, Thomas H., Horses for Courses: Fund Managers and Organizational Structures (January 22, 2008). Second Singapore International Conference on Finance 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1086542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1086542

Yufeng Han (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Charlotte - Finance ( email )

9201 University City Boulevard
Charlotte, NC 28223
United States

Michael J. Rebello

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States

Thomas H. Noe

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom

University of Oxford - Balliol College ( email )

Broad St
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom

Bank of Finland ( email )

P.O. Box 160
FIN-00101 Helsinki
Finland

European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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