Bilateral Agreements and Fair Trade Practices: A Policy Analysis of the Colombia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (2006)

24 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2008  

Kevin J. Fandl

Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management

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Abstract

This Article brings to the attention of those public servants involved in the design and negotiation of free trade agreements between the United States and developing countries, such as Colombia, the potential benefits and drawbacks of negotiating in a bilateral forum. Rather than critiquing the free trade agreement for its particular provisions, this Article examines the U.S. policy of negotiating bilaterally with developing countries as opposed to multilaterally in the world trade system and what effects such an approach might have on the economic development of the latter. Using an incremental policy analysis, the Article critiques the bilateral approach in terms of economic development and fair trade negotiations using the recent Colombia-U.S. trade agreement as a case study. The Article concludes that a bilateral approach that is disconnected from a broader multilateral context may be detrimental to developing countries and recommends increased oversight of such agreements by the World Trade Organization to ensure a higher degree of fairness.

Keywords: informal economy, colombia, trade, development, latin america, bilateral, economic growth

JEL Classification: F10, F15, F43, O17, O19, K33

Suggested Citation

Fandl, Kevin J., Bilateral Agreements and Fair Trade Practices: A Policy Analysis of the Colombia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (2006). Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 64, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1087071

Kevin J. Fandl (Contact Author)

Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
2027255305 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.globallegaled.com

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