Are Mutual Fund Fees Competitive? What IQ-Related Behavior Tells Us

33 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 2008

See all articles by Mark Grinblatt

Mark Grinblatt

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area; Yale University - International Center for Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Seppo Ikaheimo

Aalto University

Matti Keloharju

Aalto University - School of Business; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: November 18, 2007

Abstract

This study analyzes the fees of mutual funds and the choices of mutual fund investors. Using a comprehensive dataset on males in two Finnish provinces, we find that the fees of funds selected by high IQ investors are not significantly lower than the fees of funds selected by low IQ investors. This conclusion controls for a variety of fund and individual attributes that explain mutual fund fees and mutual fund choices. This suggests that fees are set competitively in the fund industry.

Suggested Citation

Grinblatt, Mark and Ikaheimo, Seppo and Keloharju, Matti, Are Mutual Fund Fees Competitive? What IQ-Related Behavior Tells Us (November 18, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1087120 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1087120

Mark Grinblatt (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-1098 (Phone)
310-206-5455 (Fax)

Yale University - International Center for Finance

Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Seppo Ikaheimo

Aalto University ( email )

P.O. Box 21210
Helsinki, 00101
Finland

Matti Keloharju

Aalto University - School of Business ( email )

P.O. Box 21210
AALTO, FI-00076
Finland
+358 40 353 8043 (Phone)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
237
rank
126,047
Abstract Views
1,190
PlumX Metrics