Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets

32 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2008 Last revised: 12 Feb 2022

See all articles by Michael Ostrovsky

Michael Ostrovsky

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Michael Schwarz

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2008

Abstract

This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.

Suggested Citation

Ostrovsky, Michael and Schwarz, Michael, Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets (January 2008). NBER Working Paper No. w13766, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1088681

Michael Ostrovsky (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-724-7280 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/ostrovsky/

Michael Schwarz

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs ( email )

Sunnyvale, CA 94089

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
22
Abstract Views
1,206
PlumX Metrics