A Multi-Agent Congestion and Pricing Model

Transportmetrica, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 237-249, 2006

27 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2008

See all articles by Xi Zou

Xi Zou

affiliation not provided to SSRN

David Matthew Levinson

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract

A multi-agent model of travelers competing to utilize a roadway in time and space is presented in this paper to illustrate the effect of congestion and pricing on traveler behaviors and network equilibrium. To realize the spillover effect among travelers, N-player games are constructed in which the strategy set include (N plus 1) strategies. We solve the N-player game (for N < or = 7) and find Nash equilibria if they exist. This model is compared to the bottleneck model. The results of numerical simulation show that the two models yield identical results in terms of lowest total costs and marginal costs when a social optimum exists.

Keywords: Agent-based Model, Game Theory, Congestion, Queueing, Traffic Flow, Congestion Pricing, Road Pricing, Value Pricing

Suggested Citation

Zou, Xi and Levinson, David Matthew, A Multi-Agent Congestion and Pricing Model. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1089128

Xi Zou

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

David Matthew Levinson (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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