Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock Ownership Plans

26 Pages Posted: 5 Feb 2008

See all articles by Sharon Hannes

Sharon Hannes

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law

Abstract

This paper develops a new understanding of equity-based compensation schemes, such as employee stock option plans. Current literature views such schemes as a measure aimed at motivating the recipient employees to work harder for the firm. Under such a view, this remuneration method either complements or substitutes other measures used to monitor the performance of the recipient employees. In contrast, this paper proposes that the recipient employee be viewed as the potential monitor of other employees and that stock options (or similar types of compensation) motivate her to fulfill this task. This view has many applications and can shed light on persistent puzzles, including why there is sweeping use of stock ownership plans by many new economy firms. No junior employee at Microsoft or Intel can improve the value of her heavyweight employer to such a degree that it will make it worthwhile for her to work harder once stock options are offered. Nevertheless, given the sensitivity of the knowledge industry to leakage of its intellectual property, all employees can add much to the company's value by standing on guard against such leakage. If technology is both a vulnerable and critical asset for the organization, option recipients will be alert in protecting against infringement. Since not much effort needs to be exerted to monitor their peers and supervisors to prevent this significant harm, incentive compensations can easily motivate employees to perform their monitoring task. Many other applications of this new view that cannot be explained by the current literature are discussed in the paper.

Keywords: Stock based compensation, Executive pay, Stock options, Agency cost

Suggested Citation

Hannes, Sharon, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Michigan Law Review, Vol. 105, p. 1421, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1090311

Sharon Hannes (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 69978, IL
Israel

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